PT - JOURNAL ARTICLE AU - Stephen Davis TI - International Trends in Corporate Governance DP - 2003 Sep 21 TA - Special Issues PG - 116--121 VI - 2003 IP - 2 4099 - https://pm-research.com/content/2003/2/116.short 4100 - https://pm-research.com/content/2003/2/116.full AB - A recent study compares international corporate governance developments in Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United States in four categories: board structure, voting rights, disclosure, and takeover defenses. Findings, mainly in 2002, reveal both slow progress and striking weaknesses in the architecture of corporate governance. In particular, new measurements designed to test management influence over boards expose a major underlying problem: boards are far less independent than is generally recognized, even when they appear to be stocked with outsiders. The fresh data raise questions about risks associated with inadequate oversight of management, suppressing scores of every surveyed market but France, where advances in law, code, and practice yielded a modest rise. Overall, the study seems to show a disconnect between the reformers and the reformed. Despite forceful initiatives by legislators, regulators, stock exchanges, and code-writers, who responded to public demand with far-reaching corporate governance changes, companies have made remarkably slow progress on the ground, exhibiting reluctance to embrace reform.